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The Global Youth Employment Challenge

In 2025, one in five young people worldwide was not in employment, education, or training (NEET): 257 million people aged 15 to 24. Two in three of them were women. In the same year, 67 million young people were unemployed, meaning without work and looking for it.1

The number of young people entering the labor market is growing fastest in Africa. Nearly two-thirds of the growth in the world’s youth population is in sub-Saharan Africa.1 The International Monetary Fund estimates that the region will account for half of the growth in the global labor force by 2030 and will need up to 15 million new jobs a year.2 The International Labour Organization (ILO) projects that Africa’s youth labor force will grow by 76 million by 2050, while it shrinks in most other regions.3

Young women are NEET twice as often as young men. The youth labor force in Africa will grow by 76 million by 2050.

Two charts side by side with one row for the world and one for each of 11 subregions. The left chart shows the share of young women and young men who were not in employment, education, or training in 2025. The right chart shows the projected change in the youth labor force from 2023 to 2050. The table below the figure gives all numbers.NEET rate, ages 15 to 24, 2025 (%)Change in youth labor force,2023 to 2050 (millions)WorldWorld: men 13.1 percentWorld: women 27.4 percent27.413.1Arab StatesArab States: men 20.5 percentArab States: women 45.2 percent45.220.5Arab States: +2.4 million+2.4Northern AfricaNorthern Africa: men 18.1 percentNorthern Africa: women 42.6 percent42.618.1Northern Africa: +3.3 million+3.3Southern AsiaSouthern Asia: men 11.6 percentSouthern Asia: women 41.0 percent41.011.6Southern Asia: −1.9 million−1.9Sub-Saharan AfricaSub-Saharan Africa: men 16.7 percentSub-Saharan Africa: women 26.5 percent26.516.7Sub-Saharan Africa: +72.6 million+72.6Latin America and the CaribbeanLatin America and the Caribbean: men 13.2 percentLatin America and the Caribbean: women 25.6 percent25.613.2Latin America and the Caribbean: −7.5 million−7.5Central and Western AsiaCentral and Western Asia: men 13.3 percentCentral and Western Asia: women 24.9 percent24.913.3Central and Western Asia: +0.8 million+0.8South-Eastern Asia and the PacificSouth-Eastern Asia and the Pacific: men 13.0 percentSouth-Eastern Asia and the Pacific: women 19.8 percent19.813.0South-Eastern Asia and the Pacific: −8.8 million−8.8Eastern EuropeEastern Europe: men 10.1 percentEastern Europe: women 14.4 percent14.410.1Eastern Europe: −1.3 million−1.3Northern AmericaNorthern America: men 11.5 percentNorthern America: women 12.0 percent12.011.5Northern America: −2.0 million−2.0Eastern AsiaEastern Asia: men 9.9 percentEastern Asia: women 11.5 percent11.59.9Eastern Asia: −32.7 million−32.7Northern, Southern and Western EuropeNorthern, Southern and Western Europe: men 11.1 percentNorthern, Southern and Western Europe: women 9.9 percent9.911.1Northern, Southern and Western Europe: −3.3 million−3.3

Note: NEET means not in employment, education, or training. Youth are people aged 15 to 24. The change in the labor force applies the 2023 youth participation rate of each subregion to the United Nations population projection for 2050.

Sources: NEET rates from International Labour Organization, Global Employment Trends for Youth 2026: Back to the Future, table A.3 (ILO modelled estimates, November 2025). Change in the labor force from International Labour Organization, Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024: Decent Work, Brighter Futures, figure 2.22 (ILO modelled estimates, November 2023, and United Nations, World Population Prospects 2022).

Data for this figure
SubregionNEET rate, women (%)NEET rate, men (%)Change in youth labor force, 2023 to 2050 (millions)
World27.413.1
Arab States45.220.5+2.4
Northern Africa42.618.1+3.3
Southern Asia41.011.6−1.9
Sub-Saharan Africa26.516.7+72.6
Latin America and the Caribbean25.613.2−7.5
Central and Western Asia24.913.3+0.8
South-Eastern Asia and the Pacific19.813.0−8.8
Eastern Europe14.410.1−1.3
Northern America12.011.5−2.0
Eastern Asia11.59.9−32.7
Northern, Southern and Western Europe9.911.1−3.3
  • Informal work is the norm. Nearly nine in ten young workers aged 15 to 29 in low- and lower-middle-income countries are in informal employment. In high-income countries the share is 12 percent.1 Informal work usually comes without a contract, social protection, or a steady income.
  • Secure jobs are rare. Two in three young adult workers aged 25 to 29 in low- and lower-middle-income countries are self-employed or hold a temporary job. In high-income countries the share is one in four.1
  • The job ladder is slippery. Workers in poorer countries move in and out of jobs more often than workers in richer countries. Most of these moves are between low-paid wage work, self-employment, and unemployment, and few lead to better-paid jobs.4
  • Education and jobs do not line up. Two in three young adult workers in developing economies hold qualifications that do not match their job well.3

Part of the problem is information. Many jobseekers have skills they cannot show and opportunities they cannot find.

  • Skills are invisible. Skills gained in informal work, caregiving, and volunteering come with no certificate, and employers cannot tell which applicants have the skills they need.
  • Information is fragmented. Job and training opportunities are scattered, unstructured, and often not digitized. Searching costs time and money that many jobseekers do not have.
  • Guidance does not reach most people. Career counselors are few. Jobseekers without personal networks search on their own.

These barriers are highest for people from poorer households, and for young women in particular. They more often lack formal credentials and the networks through which jobs are filled.

Labor market intermediation covers the services that connect jobseekers and employers: public employment services, job platforms, career guidance, and training that follows employer demand. These services work on the information barriers. They make vacancies visible, help jobseekers describe their skills, and help employers compare applicants.

Research on labor markets in low- and middle-income countries identifies missing information as one cause of poor matching between workers and jobs. Searching for work is costly, and firms cannot observe the skills of applicants who have little formal work experience.5

The evidence from recent experiments:

  • In South Africa, jobseekers who received skill assessment results that they could credibly share with firms had higher employment and earnings.6
  • In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, a workshop that helped young jobseekers signal their skills to employers raised their chances of finding formal and stable work. Four years later, participants earned more. The effects of a transport subsidy tested alongside it had faded by then.7
  • Also in Addis Ababa, a government program supplied public employment service offices with up-to-date vacancy information. Monthly earnings rose by 22 percent among women with 12 years of schooling or less. The program had no detectable effect on other jobseekers.8
  • Evidence on online job platforms is inconclusive. In South Africa, training jobseekers to use LinkedIn raised employment.9 In India, vocational training graduates who were given access to a job platform raised the wage at which they were willing to work and worked less.10 In Mozambique, inviting graduates to join job platforms had no effect on work outcomes on average, with gains for women who used a platform for informal work.11

Information is a small part of the youth employment problem. A review of job training and job search assistance in developing countries notes that early evaluations found small effects. The authors conclude that such programs still have a role, that their success depends on design and delivery that are hard to scale, and that in many cases the binding constraint is a lack of firms with job openings. Labor force surveys in the review show that most workers find jobs through personal networks or by approaching employers directly, and few through employment services.5 Slow economic growth and the exclusion of particular groups from economic life limit what any matching service can achieve.

Two arguments for intermediation remain. The first is equity. Where jobs are scarce, personal networks determine who hears about openings, and jobseekers without such networks lose out. Services that share information more evenly can widen access, although people without a phone, an internet connection, or digital skills are hard to reach online. The second is reallocation. When demand shifts between sectors or places, better information helps workers move to where the jobs are.

Digital platforms can match jobseekers and vacancies by skills as well as by job titles and diplomas. Skills gained in informal and unpaid work can then count. This requires a shared vocabulary of occupations and skills. Classifications such as ESCO and O*NET provide one. They were built for European and US labor markets and need adaptation elsewhere (see Why ESCO?).

Tabiya builds open-source tools for the information barriers:

  • The Inclusive Livelihoods Taxonomy builds on ESCO and extends it to informal and unpaid work.
  • Compass is a conversation that helps jobseekers describe their work, including informal and unpaid work, and returns it as a Skills Report.
  • The Livelihoods Classifier links the text of job postings to occupations and skills in the taxonomy.
  • Compass Connect adds career readiness training, career exploration, and job matching to Compass.

About Tabiya describes the organization and its components. Our Approach explains how partners adapt and own them.

  1. International Labour Organization. 2026. Global Employment Trends for Youth 2026: Back to the Future. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  2. International Monetary Fund. 2024. “The Clock Is Ticking: Meeting Sub-Saharan Africa’s Urgent Job Creation Challenge.” In Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa; Reforms amid Great Expectations. October. ↩

  3. International Labour Organization. 2024. “Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024: In Figures.” August 16. ↩ ↩2

  4. Donovan, K., W. J. Lu, and T. Schoellman. 2023. “Labor Market Dynamics and Development.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 138 (4): 2287–2325. ↩

  5. Carranza, E., and D. McKenzie. 2024. “Job Training and Job Search Assistance Policies in Developing Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 38 (1): 221–44. ↩ ↩2

  6. Carranza, E., R. Garlick, K. Orkin, and N. Rankin. 2022. “Job Search and Hiring with Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills.” American Economic Review 112 (11): 3547–83. ↩

  7. Abebe, G., A. S. Caria, M. Fafchamps, P. Falco, S. Franklin, and S. Quinn. 2021. “Anonymity or Distance? Job Search and Labour Market Exclusion in a Growing African City.” Review of Economic Studies 88 (3): 1279–1310. ↩

  8. Witte, M. J., J. Roth, M. Hardy, and C. J. Meyer. 2025. “Reaching Marginalized Job Seekers Through Public Employment Services: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia.” IZA Discussion Paper 18005. ↩

  9. Wheeler, L., R. Garlick, E. Johnson, P. Shaw, and M. Gargano. 2022. “LinkedIn(to) Job Opportunities: Experimental Evidence from Job Readiness Training.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 14 (2): 101–25. ↩

  10. Kelley, E. M., C. Ksoll, and J. Magruder. 2024. “How Do Digital Platforms Affect Employment and Job Search? Evidence from India.” Journal of Development Economics 166: 103176. ↩

  11. Jones, S., and K. Sen. 2022. “Labour Market Effects of Digital Matching Platforms: Experimental Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.” IZA Discussion Paper 15409. ↩